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Investment decisionTocombatclimatechange,manycountriesall aroundtheworldcurrently foster thedevelopmentof renewableen-
ergysources (RES).However, in contrast to traditional energysystems that reliedon fewcentral powerplants, RES
are typically highly decentral and spread all over a country. Against this backdrop, the promotion of a decentrali-
zation of the energy system by fostering a regional balance of energy demand and supply with a corresponding
increase in energy democracy is seen as a promising approach. However, energy democracy driven by an increas-
ing involvement of consumers requires adequate investments of consumers in their own local RES in order to be-
come active players, usually called prosumers. Risk associated with uncertain long-term electricity price
developments is generally seen as a barrier to investments. In contrast, we describe that an investment in distrib-
uted energy resources (DERs) may actually serve as a consumer's insurance against price risk. Our results set out
that the consideration of risk-aversion may actually positively shift an investment decision in renewable DERs.
This is due to the prosumer becomingmore self-sufficient and less dependent on uncertain price developments.
To analyze such an insurance effect, we create a formal decisionmodel considering the prosumer's risk-aversion
and derive the prosumer's optimal investment in renewable DERs. However, our results also indicate that under
some circumstances the insurance effect disappears: When a prosumer turns into a predominant producer, the
prosumer is again exposed to risk in terms of uncertain revenues. Ultimately, ourwork highlights the importance
of a consideration of the insurance effect when assessing an investment in renewable DERs.
© 2020 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
The energy transition challenges existing energy systems world-
wide. In particular, renewable energy sources, playing the most impor-
tant role in the energy transition, are characterized by high fluctuations
and hard predictabilities of their generation. In addition, renewable en-
ergies are typically highly regionally distributed over a country (Reiche
and Bechberger, 2004; Moriarty and Honnery, 2016; Trepper et al.,
2015; DeForest et al., 2014; Qiu et al., 2017). Due to these characteris-
tics, the integration of an increasing share of renewable energies funda-
mentally challenges and changes the existing grid infrastructure with
extreme peak situations, voltage stability issues, and an increased threat
of power outages (Alarcon-Rodriguez et al., 2010; Rodrigues et al., 2016;
Beraldi et al., 2018; Mengelkamp et al., 2018; Quadri et al., 2018). Con-
sequently, a successful energy transition will require a grid architecturetephanie.halbruegge@fim-rc.de
Olenberger),
. This is an open access article undersubstantially different from the existing one (Bullich-Massagué et al.,
2018; Mengelkamp et al., 2018; Battaglini et al., 2012).
Fostering a transformation of the existing centralized energy system
towards a decentralized one appears as an important option other than
large-scale grid expansion projects to tackle the challenges of the en-
ergy transition (Bundesverband der Energie- und Wasserwirtschaft,
2016; Quadri et al., 2018). As highlighted above, the renewables-
driven decentralization of the energy system leads to a change in the
supply structure. While the traditional, centralized energy system
used few large conventional power plants, a decentralized energy sys-
tem consists of a large number of smaller renewable distributed energy
resources (DERs) meeting power demand close to load centers (Quadri
et al., 2018). These renewable DERs include photovoltaic systems as
well aswind turbines (Akorede et al., 2010; Jiayi et al., 2008). A transfor-
mation towards a decentralized energy system may lead to a relief of
the existing electricity grid and lower the need for large-scale public
grid expansions (Bullich-Massagué et al., 2018; Quadri et al., 2018).
Though, the latter is typically related to new investments in renewable
DERs that are required to set up such a more decentralized energy sys-
tem (Bullich-Massagué et al., 2018). Against this need of adequate in-
vestments, there must be sufficient economic incentives for potentialthe CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1 Note that our single-periodmodel can easily be extended to the case of amulti-period
model. As this does not change our main results, we decided in favour of a simple model
presentation.
2 G. Fridgen et al. / Energy Economics 91 (2020) 104887consumers to decide on the installation of new renewable DERs and in
this way to turn into a prosumer (Kitzing and Weber, 2015).
Evaluating an investment in renewable DERs, by now consumers
consider possible reductions in their electricity demand from the exter-
nal market through a corresponding investment in a DER. As for a given
investment renewable DERs can generate electricity at almost zeromar-
ginal costs (Callaway et al., 2018), the consumermay ultimately be able
to realize energy cost savings over the considered planning horizon.
However, a profitable investment requires that these energy cost sav-
ings exceed the necessary amount of investment. As future cost savings
are typically highly uncertain, such uncertainties may pose severe bar-
riers to the highly needed investments (Ländner et al., 2019). In times
of the energy transitionwith a growing share of intermittent renewable
energy production and unknown future regulatory changes, energy sys-
tems are exposed to an uncertain development of long-term electricity
prices, which directly translates into a severe price risk for consumers
(Wickart and Madlener, 2007; Zangiabadi et al., 2011; Dietrich and
Weber, 2018). Accordingly, high uncertainty in future electricity prices
directly leads to an uncertain level of energy costs for energy con-
sumers. Consequently, in addition to the absolute energy savings poten-
tial, risk management and the consideration of a consumer's risk
attitude gain increasing attention (Cano et al., 2016) when evaluating
new investments in renewable DERs. In this context we refer to risk as
the quantifiable consequence resulting from uncertain electricity price
developments (Dow and Serfio, 1992). Gaining increasing attention,
such price risk together with a consumer's risk attitudemust be consid-
ered in an adequate evaluation of an investment in renewable DERs.
There is alreadyavast literature on approaches investigating theeco-
nomics of renewable DERs (Helm and Mier, 2019; Ellabban et al., 2014;
Deichmann et al., 2011; Lin and Chen, 2019; Mai et al., 2018; Steffen,
2018; Polzin et al., 2019; Zhang et al., 2019). In particular, there are dif-
ferent approaches to take uncertainty in the economics of renewable
DERs into account. One approach addresses the possibility to hedge
against possible uncertainties. In literature, there are various possibili-
ties for hedging against uncertainties, e.g., resulting from uncertain fu-
ture electricity price developments, such as financial hedging
strategies or an investment in a conventional diesel generator (Roques
et al., 2008). Another approach focuses on the consideration of uncer-
tainties in the assessment of investments in renewable DERs. In this
paper we focus on the latter approach. Even though, some of the ap-
proaches existing in literature include uncertainties in the assessment
of an investment decision in renewable DERs, many of these consider
uncertainties in terms of weather volatilities that lead to an uncertain
level of production (Mavromatidis et al., 2018; Coniglio et al., 2019). Ap-
parently, such ananalysis of renewableDERs leads to a relatively conser-
vative assessment of investments (Akbari et al., 2014; Cardoso et al.,
2013; Coniglio et al., 2019). However, basing on a mere electricity pro-
ducer perspective, the latter approaches neglect the prosumer perspec-
tive: Investing in a renewable DER, a consumer may cover a share of its
energy consumption by the installed renewable DERs and turn into a
prosumer (European Commission, 2015; Parag and Sovacool, 2016)
that interacts bidirectionally with the main grid. Especially in times of
low renewable production, the prosumer may cover a larger share of
its current energy consumption by the external grid, while in times of
an overproduction of the DERs the prosumer may sell parts of the elec-
tricity generated by the DERs to the external grid. Evaluating an invest-
ment in renewable DERs, a consumer should not only consider total
energy cost savings, but also the effect of price risk stemming from un-
certain electricity prices.
Thus, in this paper we raise the following research question (RQ):
RQ: What effect does long-term risk stemming from uncertain elec-
tricity prices have on individual consumers' investment decisions in
renewable DERs?
To answer our research question, we apply a quantitative approach
that formalizes the problem at hand. In the following we introduceour research methodology before we apply it and develop our formal
model.
2. Methodology
Ourmethodology builds on a formal analysis of the decision-making
behavior of a consumer that may turn into a prosumer by investing in
DERs. For this purpose, we refer to a principle that is founded in norma-
tive decision theory, namely the Bernoulli principle (Bernoulli, 1738,
1954). Using expectation utility theory, we describe the utility function
of the prosumer as well as its risk preferences (Markowitz, 1952; von
Neumann andMorgenstern, 1947). For themodelling of the risk prefer-
ence, we assume the Arrow-Pratt characterization of absolute risk aver-
sion (Arrow, 1970). In particular, we use an economic investment
model grounded on these theories to generally analyze the effect of
risk consideration on optimal investments in a DER. While alternative
research approaches may use statistical methods to derive correspond-
ing research insights on the basis of real-world data sets, such long-term
effects are difficult to measure with data available today. Especially
given the relatively short history of renewable DERs, an analysis of the
effect of risk-aversion on optimal long-term investment decisions is
naturally restricted by the limiteddata availability. In contrast, by apply-
ing our analytical approach, we aim at taking a first step towards a gen-
eral analysis of the main implications of risk on optimal investments in
DERs independent of a specific data set.
In the following section we first describe the underlying decision
problem. To obtain a benchmark for the assessment of the effects of
risk-aversion, we then formalize the described decision problem in an
investment model of a risk-neutral prosumer in Section 4 and formally
determine the optimal level of investment in renewable DERs. Then, in
Section 5 we formalize the model of a risk-averse prosumer and deter-
mine the corresponding optimal level of investment. To assess the over-
all effect of risk-aversion on an optimal investment, in Section 6 we
compare the results from Section 4 with those from Section 5.
3. Decision problem
We consider a prosumer who faces an investment decision regard-
ing renewable DERs. When deciding on an investment in renewable
DERs, the considered prosumer faces risk that stems from uncertain
electricity prices. Modelling such an electricity price risk, we introduce
a set of discrete and independent scenarios S = {1,…, | S| } that relate
to possible long-term electricity price developments. We assume that
the chosen set of scenarios represents a random sample of all possible
future electricity price developments. As we consider a long-term plan-
ning horizon we neglect daily volatility in renewable generation. Fur-
thermore, striving for a theoretical knowledge gain with respect to
investment behavior, we only assume a single time period.1 Inspired
by the ‘wisdom of crowds’ principle (Galton, 1907), we assume that
all possible electricity price developments are normally distributed.
Consequently, the prosumer faces electricity prices ps which depend
on the electricity price scenario s.
Depending on the revealed electricity price scenario, the prosumer
may realize different electricity cost savings, resulting from the invest-
ment in DERs and the corresponding reduction in electricity demand
from the external grid. In particular, as post-investment electricity
costs are a product of electricity prices and the possible demand reduc-
tion, the electricity cost savings over all scenarios will also be normally
distributed. Consequently, in our case we can use the utility mean-
variance, as returns (energy cost savings) are distributed normally
(Roques et al., 2008). Accounting for the corresponding price risk, the
prosumer may ultimately calculate the mean of all possible electricity
3G. Fridgen et al. / Energy Economics 91 (2020) 104887price developments as the next best guess of the expected value of the
electricity cost savings μ.
However, as the use of the expected value ignores the risk of unlikely
but possible extreme price scenarios, a risk-averse prosumer will addi-
tionally consider the deviation of possible electricity cost savings from
the expected value. Therefore, whenmodelling a risk-averse prosumer,
we also take the volatility σ2 of possible electricity cost savings into ac-
count. As a prosumer's attitude towards the occurrence of extremeprice
scenarios may differ depending on personal characteristics and the de-
cision situation at hand, we also include a prosumer-specific risk atti-
tude α in the model. Integrating these measures, we apply the
security equivalent as an evaluation measure considering the expected
value and volatility of the electricity cost savings as well as the
prosumer's risk attitude (Buhl et al., 2018). In this context, the security
equivalent for normally distributed random variables and an exponen-
tial utility function has been widely used for decisions in a techno-
economic context, e.g. in Beer et al. (2015), Beer et al. (2013) and
Fridgen and Müller (2011). It represents the risk adjusted value of the
prosumer's utility, i.e., the net electricity cost savings resulting from
the investment in renewable DERs. This approach is based on the
Bernoulli principle itself and has established as a standard in decision
theory (Bernoulli, 1738, 1954).
Φ μ; σÞð ¼ μ−α σ2 ð1Þ
Note that the above risk-aversion parameter α is a linear transfor-
mation of the Arrow-Pratt characterization of absolute risk-aversion
(Arrow, 1970; Borch, 1969; Buhl et al., 2018; Feldstein, 1969; Fridgen
and Müller, 2011). Consequently, the higher the value of α, the more
risk-averse is the prosumer and the less the prosumer tolerates uncer-
tainties in terms of deviations from an expected value of electricity
cost savings. Finally, applying the above security equivalent, we model
the investment problem considering expected electricity cost savings
as well as the risk associated with them.
4. Optimal investment in DERs of a risk-neutral prosumer
We consider a consumer with a corresponding consumption
unit that may represent, e.g., a private household or an industrial
consumer. The consumer meets its electricity demand by purchas-
ing electricity from the external grid at electricity prices whose fu-
ture development is uncertain. Consequently, the purchase of
electricity results in electricity procurement costs at an uncertain
level. Investing in renewable DERs, the consumer is able to satisfy
a share of its electricity demand through its own production and
in this way turns into a prosumer. As DERs typically produce at
marginal costs approximating zero, the prosumer may reduce
the amount of electricity purchased from the grid and in conse-
quence decrease electricity procurement costs. However, choosing
an optimal investment, the consumer, who will turn into a
prosumer, must consider both the described electricity procure-
ment cost savings and the necessary investments.
In this sectionwe consider a risk-neutral prosumer that accounts for
themean of all possible electricity price developments, the so-called ex-
pected value of thenet electricity cost savings μ. In the following,we for-
malize the problem at hand and determine the optimal investment,
which maximizes the prosumer's net cost savings.
4.1. Formalization of the investment problem
We describe the ex-ante given and deterministic electricity
demand of the prosumer by the non-negative parameter dante ≥ 0.
As our prosumer is a former pure consumer, we assume an electricity
demand greater than zero, i.e., dante > 0. Satisfying this demand, the
prosumer purchases the required electricity from the external grid at
an electricity price ps ≥ 0. Considering uncertain electricity prices, weadditionally make the realistic assumption of a positive price variance








> 0. Note that this modelling choice
does not include sudden changes in grid tariffs or other regulatory
measures. We denote the product of electricity demand and electricity
prices as the prosumer's uncertain electricity procurement costs ECsante,
i.e., ECsante= dante ps.
By investing in renewable DERs, the prosumer can reduce its ex-ante
given electricity demand dante, whereas the extent of the possible
demand reduction is affected by the endogenous, non-negative level of
investment I ≥ 0. In particular, we introduce dpost(I) as the post-
investment electricity demand function that depends on the chosen
level of investment I in renewable DERs. In the remainder of this paper,
for the sake of simplicity, wewill assume that dpost(I) is an affine-linear
function dpost(I) = dante− vI. The parameter v ≥ 0 describes linear rela-
tionship between the possible electricity demand reduction and the
level of investment I, i.e., an increase in the level of investment of one
unitwill result in vunits of electricitydemand reduction.Wewill restrict
v to values in the range of [0,1], which may, e.g., describe the relative
availability of sun or wind. Again, uncertain electricity procurement
costs are the product of the electricity demandand the respective uncer-
tain electricity price. As post-investment demand is a function of I, also
thepost-investmentprocurementcostswilldependontherespective in-
vestment: ECspost(I)= dpost(I)ps. Note that with a growing size of the re-
newable DERs, i.e., with an increasing level of investment, the
renewable DERs may generate more electricity than needed by the
prosumer. Consequently,weexplicitly allow for anegativeelectricityde-
mand of the prosumer, which corresponds to a sale of the surplus elec-
tricity to the external grid. As future feed-in prices are hard to predict,
we assume that the prosumer sells and purchases electricity at the
same price. In such cases, our prosumer actually acts as a producer.
Based on the above notations, we can now formally define the
difference between the electricity costs ex-post and ex-ante,
resulting in the electricity cost savings ΔEC(I) associated with a
level of investment I. As we model a risk-neutral prosumer, we
will use the mean of electricity procurement cost savings over all
electricity price scenarios:





Considering the investment that the prosumer has to pay ini-
tially for the renewable DERs, we introduce a quadratic investment
function F(I) = − aI2 − bI + c. The investment function consist of
three parts. First, the parameter b > 0 describes a linear increase of
the per MW investment. Second, we additionally assume that there
is also a disproportional growth in investments with an increasing
size of the DER. In particular, we consider the case where with an in-
creasing DER size, the prosumer needs to purchase land or larger
technical facilities, e.g., a larger transformer capacity, whose costs
grow disproportionally. Against this backdrop, we make the realis-
tic assumption that the prosumer preferably uses the cheapest al-
ternative for the installation of the renewable DER, however, with
an increasing I, more expensive technical facilities may be needed.
The respective disproportional increase is determined by the coeffi-
cient a > 0. Finally, we introduce the constant investment cost
c > − ∞ which may account for either additional fixed installation
costs (c < 0) or for granted subsidies for the installation of renew-
able energies (c > 0). Both fixed installation cost and subsidies are
independent of the size of the invested DERs.
The model's objective refers to a maximization of the difference be-
tween the ex-ante and ex-post energy costs ΔEC(I) taking the corre-
sponding investment function F(I) into account. Ultimately, we have:
H Ið Þ ¼ ΔEC Ið Þ þ F Ið Þ ¼




vpsI þ c ð3Þ
4.2. Determination of the optimal investment













(for details refer to Appendix A.1). As the coefficient a represents the
scaling factor of the assumed quadratic cost function with a > 0, the de-
nominator of Eq. (4) will always be positive. However, depending on
the input parameter constellation, the optimal investment of a risk-
neutral consumer will either be zero or strictly larger than zero. Fig. 1 il-
lustrates the shape of the objective function for the two relevant cases of
the investment decision of a risk-neutral consumer. In Eq. (4), we di-
rectly see that for an input parameter constellation where b − d ≥ 0
holds for a given b > 0, the optimal level of investment of a risk-
neutral consumer will be zero given the assumed non-negativity of
the investment. In this case, the aggregated mean per unit of energy
cost savings is lower than the linear per MW investments, i.e., the aver-
age costs per unit of renewable DER are too expensive for a risk-neutral
investor. For an input parameter constellationwhere d− b> 0 holds for
a given b > 0, there is an optimal level of investment of a risk-neutral
consumer strictly larger than zero. In this case, up to the optimal invest-
ment, the aggregatedmean per unit of energy cost savings is larger than
the linear per MW investments, i.e., a risk-neutral investor would
choose an optimal investment in renewable DERs taking into account
that for investments beyond this optimal investment the energy cost
savings per invested unit cannot justify any further investment.
5. Optimal investment in DERs of a risk-averse prosumer
Only using the expected value of cost savings, the risk-neutral
prosumer in Section 4 ignores the risk of unlikely but possible extreme
price scenarios. When considering a risk-averse prosumer, we now ad-
ditionally account for the deviation of possible electricity cost savings
from the expected value. Therefore, we model a risk-averse prosumer
taking the volatility σ2 of possible electricity cost savings into account.
In the following, we formalize the corresponding decision problem
and determine the optimal investment of the risk-averse prosumer.Fig. 1. Shapes of the objective function for the two input p5.1. Formalization of the investment problem
In Section 3 we already introduced the security equivalent (Eq. (1))
as an evaluation measure which considers both the expected value and
the volatility of electricity procurement cost savings for a given
prosumer's risk attitude. As the risk-neutral prosumer in Section 3 al-
ready includes the expected value in form of a mean over all possible
electricity procurement cost savings, we add a risk-adjusting term to
Objective (3) in order to account for the corresponding risk-aversion.
This risk-adjusting term R(I) considers the change in variance resulting
from a given level of investment I, i.e., the difference between the
ex-ante variance without investment σante2 and the ex-post variance
σpost(I)2 after an investment in renewable DERs, and adjusts it by the
prosumer's risk-aversion α.
R Ið Þ ¼ ασ2 dante2− dante−vI
 2 
ð5Þ
As themodel's objective is tomaximize thebeneficial effect of the in-
vestment in renewable DERs for a risk-averse prosumer, we compare
the security equivalent of a prosumer that may decide to make an in-
vestmentΦpost(I) to the security equivalent for the case without an in-
vestment Φante. Therefore, the resulting objective function maximizes
the difference between the two security equivalents with respect to
the corresponding investment function F(I):





þ α dante2  dante  vI
 2 
σ2 ð6Þ
5.2. Determination of the optimal investment
For a risk-averse prosumer, we can derive the following optimal
level of investment (for details refer to Appendix A.2):
IAV ¼
d−bþ e
2aþ 2 f ð7Þ
In the above equation, for notational convenience we use the substi-
tutions e≔ α2dantevσ2 and f ≔ αv2σ2. Since the risk-aversion parame-
ter for a risk-averse prosumer is α > 0 and we assume an aggregated
demand dante> 0 aswell as v > 0, the parameters e and f describe a pos-
itive term. Consequently, the denominator of Eq. (7)will always be pos-
itive. However, similar to the case of a risk-neutral investor, the optimal
investment of a risk-averse consumer will also be either zero or larger
than zero depending on the respective input parameter constellation.
Fig. 2 illustrates the shape of the objective function for the two relevant
cases of the investment decision of a risk-averse consumer. In Eq. (7),
we see that for an input parameter constellation where b − d ≥ earameter constellations for the risk-neutral prosumer.
Fig. 2. Shapes of the objective function for the two input parameter constellations for the risk-averse prosumer.
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sumerwill be zero given the assumed non-negativity of the investment.
In this case, the aggregatedmeanper unit of energy cost savings is lower
than the linear per MW investments, i.e., the average costs per unit of
renewable DER are too expensive for a risk-neutral investor. However,
in contrast to a risk-neutral consumer's optimal investment (Fig. 1),
the parameter e accounting for risk additionally influences the invest-
ment decision of a risk-averse consumer. For an input parameter con-
stellation where b − d < e holds for a given b > 0, similar to the case
of a risk-neutral consumer, the optimal level of investment of a
risk-averse consumer is larger than zero. Though, in contrast to a
risk-neutral investor (see Fig. 1), again, the parameter e affects the in-
vestment decision of a risk-averse consumer. In the present case, up to
the optimal investment the aggregated mean per unit of energy cost
savings plus a risk-adjusting term are larger than the linear per MW
investments.
6. On the insurance effect of renewable DERs
To determine the effect that risk-aversion can have on an optimal in-
vestment in renewable DERs, we formally compare the optimal invest-
ments of Sections 4 and 5 before we discuss the economic implications
of the identified mathematical results.
For a comparison of the optimal investment of a risk-neutral and a
risk-averse prosumer,we take their two cases of a positive and a zero in-
vestment (see also Sections 4.2 and 5.2) into account, respectively. In
total, we have tomake three different comparisons (a) to (c) as summa-
rized in Table 1. In particular, in each of the three comparisons we
calculate the difference between the optimal levels of investments
ΔI = IAV∗ − IN∗ and determine the positivity/negativity of the respective
difference.
Overall, Table 1 indicates that in at least two out of three parameter
constellations, the consideration of risk-aversion results in an equal or
even higher optimal level of investment.
In case (a), neither a risk-neutral nor a risk-averse prosumer invests
in renewable DERs. In this case, the initial investment for the renewable
DER exceeds the mean of energy cost savings over the whole planning
horizon. At the same time, also a reduction in energy cost savings vola-
tility does not justify an investment due to the high initial investment.Table 1
Difference in optimal investments between risk-neutral and risk-averse prosumer for
three different input parameter constellations.
Case (a):
b − d ≥ e
Case (b):
0 ≤ b − d < e
Case (c):
b − d < 0
IN
∗ 0 0 d − b
2a
IAV
∗ 0 d − b þ e
2 a þ fð Þ
d − b þ e
2 a þ fð Þ
ΔI 0 d − b þ e
2 a þ fð Þ
2αvσ2 dante − v d − b2a
 Accordingly, the consideration of risk does not affect a prosumer's deci-
sion on an investment in renewable DERs for this input parameter
constellation.
In case (b), a risk-neutral prosumer does not invest in renewable
DERs, while a risk-averse prosumer invests a strictly positive amount.
Consequently, for the second input parameter constellation, risk-
aversion positively shifts a prosumer's decision on an investment in re-
newable DERs, i.e., the prosumer's optimal level of investment
increases.
By considering not only the mean cost savings but also the price risk
that the prosumer is exposed to, the risk-averse prosumer in case
(b) also assesses the extent to which the cost savings of the individual
scenarios differ from each other, i.e., howmuch the prosumer is still ex-
posed to uncertain electricity prices due to external purchases from the
grid. Reducing the electricity demand from the grid by an investment in
renewable DERs, in case (b) the risk-averse prosumer is less exposed to
uncertain developments in electricity prices. Thus, the investment in re-
newable DERs functions as an insurance against uncertain electricity
price developments. Consequently, for a risk-averse prosumer as in
case (b), the protection against the risk stemming from uncertain elec-
tricity procurement costs represents an additional value given the in-
vestment in renewable DERs. In the following, we refer to this effect
as the insurance effect of renewable DERs against uncertain electricity
price developments. Contrary to current literature that identified uncer-
tainty and ultimately risk consideration to result in a decreasing/weaker
investment (Coniglio et al., 2019; Mavromatidis et al., 2018), it is actu-
ally the risk consideration and more precisely the insurance effect that
shifts the optimal level of investment in the upward direction in
case (b).
Finally, in case (c), both the risk-neutral and the risk-averse
prosumer invest a strictly positive amount. However, the sign of the cor-
responding investment difference is ex-ante unclear. Therefore, in the
following we will analyze, under which conditions the risk-averse
prosumer of case (c) will invest (c-i) more, (c-ii) less, or (c-iii) the
same amount as the risk-neutral prosumer. To this end, we first start
with subcase (c-i) where risk-aversion increases the investment
amount, i.e., IAV∗ > IN∗. Reformulating the latter inequality, we arrive at a
condition on the corresponding input parameters, where the term for
the investment difference is greater than zero:





We can see that as the ex-ante electricity demand dante ceteris
paribus increases, not only the optimal level of investment of the risk-
averse prosumer but also the corresponding difference to the optimal
level of investment of the risk-neutral prosumer increases.
For the subcases (c-ii) and (c-iii), we get similar conditions by re-






















Level of Investment (I)
Fig. 3. Objective function of a risk-neutral prosumer.
2 Note that for a sufficiently large α, the formula will take a value of d
ante
v , i.e., 40 for
our case.
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tions of case (c), under which the risk-averse prosumer invests more
than the risk-neutral prosumer, i.e., subcase (c-i). In particular, for con-
stellations, where dante−v d−b2a is positive, which can be interpreted as
the ex-ante electricity demand being sufficiently high to justify the
risk-neutral investment (similar to case (b)), the risk-averse investment
is actually greater than the risk-neutral one.
In subcase (c-ii) the consideration of risk-aversion actually results in
a lower optimal level of investment as compared to the optimal invest-
ment of the risk-neutral prosumer. In order to understand this parame-
ter constellation, we again consider the risk-adjusting term in Eq. (5).
For a given ex-ante electricity demand of the former consumer dante,
an increasing investment in renewable DERs I, as stated above, first re-
sults in an increasing insurance effect as the dependency on uncertain
electricity prices decreases. The risk-adjusting term R(I) positively shifts
the optimal level of investment and thereby confirms an investment de-
cision in renewable DERs. Though, with an increasing level of invest-
ment, the prosumer reduces the ex-ante electricity demand
completely (self-supply exceeds the own demand) and sells an increas-
ing amount of electricity to the grid. At this point the prosumer turns
into a producer. Consequently, a consumer, investing in renewable
DERs,first turns into a prosumerwith a predominant share of consump-
tion, while with an increasing level of investment, the former consumer
turns into a prosumer with a predominant share of production. In the
following, wewill denote these two types of prosumers as the ‘consum-
ing prosumer’ and the ‘producing prosumer’. In Eq. (5) we recognize
this shift from the ‘consuming’ to the ‘producingprosumer’when the in-
vestment in DERs I becomes so large that the term dante2− (dante− vI)2
takes a negative value and the risk-adjusting term R(I) lowers the objec-
tive function value, i.e., the investment increases risk. The change in sign
(from positive to negative) of the risk-adjusting term clarifies that for
the consuming prosumer a consideration of risk-aversion results in a
higher investment, as a reduced variance in electricity costs appears as
an additional value – the insurance effect of renewable DERs confirms
the investment decision. For the producing prosumer, however, risk
stemming from uncertain electricity price developments leads to a de-
creasing benefit of the investment in renewable DERs as they indicate
uncertain revenues of the corresponding sales.
The risk-neutral prosumer, however, only considers themean of the
energy costs savings and obviously the initial investment. Consequently,
as the risk-adjusting termdoes not affect the risk-neutral prosumer's in-
vestment decision, for subcase (c-ii) the risk-neutral investment is
higher than the risk-averse one.
The parameter constellation of subcase (c-iii) is a special case that
only holdswhen due to a given ex-ante demand dante of the former con-
sumer and a given efficiency in demand reduction v, the insurance effect
formally does not exist. In this case, the risk-adjusting term R(I) as-
sumes a value of zero and both objective functions are equal.
7. Exemplary case study
In this section we use an academic example to illustrate the identi-
fied insurance effect of renewable DERs. In order to keep the example
as simple as possible, we assume two scenarios S = {1,2} that corre-
spond to a high price and a low price scenario, respectively. The given
consumer requires 40 units of electricity to satisfy the ex-ante demand.
Correspondingprices under the two scenarios are 30 and 50with a price
volatility of σ2 = 200. Finally, we assume the following investment
function, where v = 1 holds:
F Ið Þ ¼ −I2−4I
Note that assuming v=1,mean cost savings per invested unit equal
the mean of the electricity prices, i.e., G(I) = 40I.For the given parameter setting, the objective function for the risk-
neutral prosumer writes:
H Ið Þ ¼ F Ið Þ þ EC Ið Þ ¼ −I2 þ 36I:
Fig. 3 shows the corresponding optimal investment of IN∗ = 18. As
can directly be seen, by investing in a DER, the risk-neutral prosumer
purchases only purchases 22 units from the external market at uncer-
tain prices.
Modelling a risk-averse prosumer with a risk-aversion parameter of
α = 1, we first calculate the corresponding risk-adjusting term:
R Ið Þ ¼ ασ2 dante2− dante−vI
 2 
¼ −200I2 þ 16000I
Adding the risk-adjusting term to the objective function of the risk-
neutral prosumer, we get the objective function of the risk-averse
prosumer:
ΔΦ Ið Þ ¼ F Ið Þ þ EC Ið Þ þ R Ið Þ ¼ −201I2 þ 16036I








2aþ 2 f ¼
40−4þ 16000
2  1þ 2  200 ¼ 39:89
The results from this simple example indicate that the optimal level
of investment of the risk-averse prosumer is indeed higher than the one
of the risk-neutral prosumer. Accordingly, condition (18) is satisfied. In
our case, the risk-averse prosumer invests 21.89 units more than the
risk-neutral one, as this additional investment results in a reduction in
external purchases and ultimately in a reduction of volatility, i.e., risks
for the risk-averse prosumer. The insurance effect of the renewable
DER, assessed by the risk-averse prosumer, consequently, positively
shifts the investment decision.
We now can determine the reduction of volatility resulting from the
risk-neutral and the risk-averse optimal investment. In particular, the
risk-averse prosumer is able to reduce the ex-ante investment volatility
in energy costs by 100%, while the risk-neutral prosumer only reduces

























Fig. 4. Risk-adjusting term for different ex-ante electricity demands The figure illustrates
former consumers with a maximum risk-adjusting term of an ex-ante demand of
(a) 20 units, (b) 30 units, and (c) 40 units. The solid function describes the risk-adjusted
term for the case of 40 units, the dashed function for the case of 30 units, the dotted
function 20 units.
7G. Fridgen et al. / Energy Economics 91 (2020) 104887However, as our results from Section 6 already indicate, the optimal
level of investment of a risk-averse prosumer especially depends on the
given ex-ante electricity demand of the former consumer dante. In the
following, we therefore illustrate the shift from a consuming prosumer
to a producing prosumer using our academic example. As pointed out
above, the objective function of the risk-averse prosumer takes the
risk-adjusting term R(I) into account, whichultimately affects the corre-
sponding investment. Fig. 4 therefore illustrates the risk-adjusting term
for three different ex-ante electricity demands of 20, 30, and 40 units.
We clearly see that with an increasing ex-ante demand, the maximum
of the risk-adjusting term shifts to higher investments.
Additionally, Fig. 4 also illustrates the level of investment at which
the shift from a consuming prosumer to a producing prosumer appears,
namely the corresponding maximum of the function.
Next, we draw the objective function of a risk-averse prosumer for
the three given ex-ante electricity demands.
Fig. 5 illustrates the increasing optimal level of investment for a risk-
averse prosumerwith an increasing ex-ante electricity demand. This ef-
fect results from the increasing risk-adjusting term, illustrated in Fig. 4.
Note that in our case themaximaof the functions in Fig. 4match the cor-
responding maxima in Fig. 5, as we assume a risk-aversion parameter
α = 1 and a demand reduction efficiency v = 1. Consequently, the op-
timal investment of the risk-averse prosumer equals the prosumer's ex-
ante electricity demand as a former consumer.
Considering the three objective functions in Fig. 5, we can divide



































Fig. 5. Risk-averse objective function for different ex-ante electricity demands The figure
illustrates former consumers with the optimal level of investment of an ex-ante demand
of (a) 20 units, (b) 30 units, and (c) 40 units. The solid function describes the optimal
investment for the case of 40 units, the dashed function for the case of 30 units, the
dotted function for the case of 20 units.maxima (a), (b) and (c), both the expected value of electricity cost sav-
ings and the reduction in variance increase with an increasing level of
investment I. For levels of investment beyond the maxima for which
the objective function value takes a positive sign the expected electricity
cost savings increase further, but the reduction in variance decreases
from here on. Finally, for levels of investment for which the objective
function value takes a negative sign the expected electricity cost savings
increase further, however, the level of the ex-post variance by now
dominates the electricity cost savings.
8. Conclusion
This paper analyzes the effect that risk stemming from uncertain
electricity prices can have on individual consumer's investment deci-
sions in renewable DERs. To do so, we propose an economic investment
model grounded on decision- and expectation utility theory. As a
benchmark for the assessment of the effect of risk-aversion on an in-
vestment decision in renewable DERs, we first formulate the invest-
ment model for a risk-neutral prosumer. Next, we extend our model
by a risk-adjusting term that accounts for the risk-aversion of a
prosumer as well as by the variance of the energy cost savings after
the investment decision. Comparing the optimal investment of the
two models, we can analyze, which effect the consideration of risk-
aversion has on an investment decision in renewable DERs. Finally, we
apply both models to an exemplary case in order to illustrate our
main findings.
Our results indicate that the consideration of risk-aversion affects an
investment decision in renewable DERs. In fact, we point out that in the
case of a prosumer with a low share of electricity sale to the grid, the in-
tegration of risk-aversion increases the level of anoptimal investment in
renewable DERs.We attribute these results to the insurance effect of re-
newable DERs. In particular, we conclude that for such a risk-averse
consuming prosumer, a reduction in demand resulting from an invest-
ment in DERs leads to a reduction in the risk stemming from uncertain
electricity prices. Thus, the investment can be interpreted as an insur-
ance premium. Furthermore, our results indicate that for an increasing
level of investment in renewable DERs, the consuming prosumer at
some point turns into a producing prosumer whose production share
is predominant in comparison to the prosumer's share of consumption.
We point out that for such a producing prosumer, an increasing invest-
ment results in an increasing volatility in revenues from the DERs'
production.
Even though our research can be seen as a valuable starting point for
the analysis of the described insurance effect of DERs, our research still
has some limitations, which actually demonstrate the potential for fu-
ture work in this field of research: Our model is based on the security
equivalent. Thus, we assume the decisionmaker to have an exponential
utility function. At the same time, the model assumes a rational
decision-maker acting based on risk-aversion, which is only defined
by a risk-aversion parameter. Obviously, this constitutes main simplifi-
cations of real-word-decision making. Nevertheless, the security equiv-
alent may in general be seen as an established model in research and
therefore suitable for our context. Also, there may be other sources of
risk, e.g., the threat of a blackout that may encourage an investment in
renewable DERs that we do not model explicitly. Furthermore, our ap-
proach currently does not take into account alternative hedging possi-
bilities, e.g., financial hedging strategies in terms of one year contracts.
An investment other than in a DER, e.g., in a conventional diesel gener-
ator, may additionally represent a scalable generation resource to par-
tially cover an ex-ante demand (Roques et al., 2008). However, the
use of a non-renewable energy resource results in an additional depen-
dency on external price risks that, e.g., need to be addressed by fuel mix
diversification (Awerbuch, 2000; Awerbuch and Berger, 2003; Bar-Lev
and Katz, 1976; Humphreys and McClain, 1998; Roques et al., 2008).
An integrated approach considering alternative investment options for
hedging against uncertain electricity prices could therefore be
8 G. Fridgen et al. / Energy Economics 91 (2020) 104887investigated in future research. Another limitation of our work is our
modelling of electricity prices. We consider wholesale prices, whose
long-term price level is normally distributed. Moreover, we assume
that the prosumer sells and purchases electricity at the same price. In
fact, the used wholesale price does only represent a part of the final
end-consumer price. In reality, for instance grid tariffs make up a large
part of final end-consumer prices, which, however, are typically deter-
mined by complex future regulation being hard to anticipate and quan-
tify. An analysis of such factors therefore constitutes part of further
research. Also, a rebound effect leading to an increasing demand of con-
sumers after investing in renewable DERsmay have implications for ex-
pected electricity cost savings and therefore on the insurance effect
itself (Havas et al., 2015; Qui et al., 2019; Toroghi and Matthew,
2019). We consider a proper modelling and analysis of such effect to
be relevant for future research.
Despite these limitations, our results have important theoretical im-
plications. Ourwork provides an extension of the existing literature that
up to nowmainly considers uncertainties, for instance in form of a hard
predictability of weather developments, which ultimately result in a
more conservative assessment of the economic potential of DERs.
Against this backdrop, we have developed a model that takes risk in
terms of uncertain price developments and the risk-aversion of the
prosumer into account when deciding on investments in DERs. In addi-
tion, we were able to expand the known applications for DERs by illus-
trating that DERs can be used as an insurance against uncertain
electricity prices. In this respect, there are obviously alsomajor implica-
tions for practice. For example, our results demonstrate that a pure con-
sideration of energy cost savings is not sufficient to assess the full
potential of DERs. Practitioners should also consider the insurance effect
of DERs as an additional incentive for consumers to make their invest-
ment decision in renewable DERs. In fact, an appropriate consideration
of the insurance effectmight increase consumers' involvement as active
players in energy systems and ultimately lead to an increasing decen-
tralization and energy democracy.
However, if, due to the insurance effect an increasing number
of consumers were to invest in renewable DERs, total market de-
mand would tend to decrease and in direct consequence average
market prices will decrease as well. At the same time, a reduced
market demand would also lead to a loss of financial resources
available for maintenance and development of the public grid in-
frastructure due to a reduced overall amount of paid grid fees. Ul-
timately, this may result in an increase in the level of grid fees
that must be paid by the (remaining) consumers that buy from
the market, and thus increasing end-consumer prices. Such price
increase in turn implies a higher importance of the insurance ef-
fect. Overall, politics and regulation play an important role in
responding to such self-reinforcing promotion of renewable ener-
gies. In particular, it will be the task of policymakers to pursue a
consistent energy market policy that takes such developments to-
gether with possible distributional effects into account. The latter
may for instance stem from the fact that not all consumers may
be able to invest in DERs and would ultimately have to bear
higher energy costs. Overall, the corresponding incentives for ap-
propriate investments in DERs may contribute to a further devel-
opment of renewable energy sources, a corresponding reduction
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Appendix A. Appendix
A.1. Determination of the optimal investment of a risk-neutral prosumer
As Objective (3) is a strictly concave function with ∂
2 H
∂ I2
¼ −2a < 0,
we can directly take its first derivative and set it to zero in order to de-
rive the optimal level of investment for a risk neutral prosumer:
∂ H
∂ I




vps ¼ 0 ðA:1Þ
Solving Eq. (A.1) for I, we obtain the following optimal level of in-









For notational convenience and improved readability, throughout







Note that the parameter d refers to the mean of electricity procure-
ment cost savings per invested unit over all electricity price scenarios.
A.2. Determination of the optimal level of investment for a risk-averse
prosumer
In order to determine the optimal investment for a risk-averse
prosumer, we again take the first and second derivative of the objective
function (6) with respect to I:
∂ ΔΦ
∂ I








As we consider a risk-averse prosumer (α > 0), we infer for Objec-
tive (6) to be a strictly concave function with ∂
2ΔΦ
∂ I2
< 0 and directly








v ps þ α 2dantevσ2−2 α I v2σ2 ¼ 0 ðB:3Þ
Solving Eq. (B.1) for I, we obtain the following optimal investment







2a þ 2αv2σ2 ðB:4Þ
Again, for notational convenience and improved readability, in the
main part of the paper we will make use of two notations simplifying
Eq. (B.1):
9G. Fridgen et al. / Energy Economics 91 (2020) 104887e ≔ α 2 dantevσ2; f ≔ α v2σ2 ðB:5Þ
Using this notation, we can rewrite the optimal level of investment
for a risk-averse prosumer (Eq. (B.1)) as:
IAV ¼
d−b þ e
2a þ 2 f ðB:6Þ
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